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THE BANKING AND SECURITIES SCANDALS AND
FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES OF COMMERCIAL
JURISPRUDENCEt
Written by Seiji Tanakalt
Translation by Yutaka Nakamurat
Abstract: The recent Japanese banking and securities scandals are among the most
serious events that the Japanese business community has ever experienced. This article,
written by Professor Seiji Tanaka, and translated by Yutaka Nakamura, analyzes these
events applying positive laws from Professor Tanaka's standpoint, emphasizing the
social responsibilities that corporations should have in Japanese society. The article
relies on the basic purposes and provisions of the Japanese Commercial and Civil Codes
and establishes organic principles of social responsibility for Japanese corporations to
follow. Finally, the article emphasizes that a high standard of conduct, based on these
principles of social responsibility, is necessary for Japanese corporations to maintain the
trust of the international community.
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent banking and securities scandals [of 1991] are serious events
in the Japanese business community. Scholars in the field have reason to
study the legal ramifications of the scandals because of their relation to
commercial jurisprudence. However, commercial law scholars have not dealt
sufficiently with the matter. My position on fundamental commercial
jurisprudence has been to emphasize the social role of corporations. In
February 1991, I published a book titled, Emphasizing Corporate Social
Responsibility in Commercial Jurisprudence. Using the ideas from my book
as a basis, this article examines the recent banking and securities scandals,
summarizes my conclusions, and considers their possible usefulness in
society.
t Translated from Seiji Tanaka, Kinyfl sh5kenfush5ji to sh5jihdgaku no kiso riron, 1265 Shfji h5mu
2(1991).
tt Professor Seiji Tanaka is Professor Emeritus at Hitotsubashi University and an academician at The
Japan Academy.
: B.L., 1986 Kyushu University; LL.M., 1992 University of Washington; In-house counsel for
Kawasaki Steel Corporation, Japan. The translator wishes to thank David Kokkui Lin for his assistance in
the preparation of this translation.
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2. THE RELATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES SCANDALS TO
COMMERCIAL JURISPRUDENCE
"Banking scandals" here refers to the huge loans made by persons
connected with the Sumitomo Bank through non-bank financial institutions'
in speculative land purchases. This situation resulted in skyrocketing land
prices that left the average citizen at a disadvantage in the real estate market.
Persons connected with the Fuji Bank, the Tokai Bank, and the Kyowa
Saitama Bank2 loaned huge amounts of money from non-bank financial
institutions as security consisting of forged saving certificates and pledge
agreements. "Securities scandals" refers to compensation paid by the
Nomura Securities Company and other major securities companies to
customers who lost money on stock transactions. The brokerage houses had
guaranteed their customers a certain percentage yield and promised to
compensate for any shortfall at the time of purchase of the stocks, or
compensate actual losses or shortfalls after the transactions. Other illegal
acts, such as manipulating stock market prices or dealing with underground
organizations, are not included in the scope of "securities scandals" for the
purposes of this article because space is limited and they have already
occurred [and been discussed] several times in the past.
The scandals are such a significant issue that the entire business
community is now trying to agree on prevention programs. The Diet views
the scandals as a serious issue and has created a special committee to address
the issues. The bill to amend the Securities and Exchange Act was proposed
and discussed in the Diet resulting in the Act Amending the Securities and
Exchange Act [of 1948] finally being enacted.
On the other hand, commercial law scholars apparently still have not
sufficiently addressed the same issue. Traditionally, commercial jurisprudence
has limited its scope to private law, such as civil or commercial law. The
focus of commercial jurisprudence has been limited to the detailed analysis
and clarification of the legal structure of a specific legal system through
I [Translator's Note] In Japan, banking business is regulated by the Banking Law (Gink5 H8). The
English translation of the Banking Law used here is taken from Eibun Harei Sha Law Bulletin Series
Japan, Vol. VI BA 2. "Bank" is defined as an institution engaged in the banking business which is
"[r]eceiving of deposits or installment savings together with lending of funds or discounting bills or
notes." Banking Law article 2(2)(i) (emphasis added). "Non-bank" financial institutions generally refers
to the institutions which lend finds but do not receive deposits (e.g., leasing companies), thus falling
outside the regulation of the Banking Law.
2 [Translator's Note] Kyowa Saitama Bank has formally changed its name to "The Asahi Bank,
Limited."
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extensive use of every provision in the Civil Code and the Commercial Code.
For instance, one of the areas of greatest interest among commercial law
scholars is the effect of transactions between a corporation and its directors
under article 265 of the Commercial Code. The scandal controversies,
meanwhile, are considered illegal corporate activities better resolved under
tort or criminal law and thus fall outside the area of commercial
jurisprudence.
However, in my view, these problems are of prime importance to
commercial jurisprudence since they relate to the extent to which
corporations can perform social roles. I have advocated for years that
commercial jurisprudence should emphasize society's needs. In the
introduction to my book published in October 1990, I expressed my regret of
an incident in which employees of Daiwa Securities Company, one of the four
biggest securities companies in Japan, compensated customers for losses from
declining stock prices. At the same time, employees of the Sumitomo Bank
loaned inordinate sums of money through non-bank financial institutions for
speculative land purchases which were fueling skyrocketing land prices.
3. COMMERCIAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EMPHASIS ON SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATIONS
Legal history, general legal philosophy, and commercial law
philosophy all implicitly recognize an important facet of commercial
jurisprudence today: emphasis on the corporate social role in the enactment
and interpretation of law.3 Japan legislated corporation law, approved the
corporation system, and affirmed its development with the intent of providing
for corporate public service, corporate social roles, and the production of
goods and services useful to society. Therefore, in consideration of that
legislative intent, the [future] legislative policy regarding the interpretation of
corporation law should be constructed so as to sufficiently allow corporations
to perform their social role. It is from this standpoint that I would like to
analyze the scandals.
3 Seiji Tanaka, Kigy5 no shakaiteki yakuwariishi no shji h~gaku (Emphasizing Corporate Social
Responsibility in Commercial Jurisprudence) 5.
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4. THE REASON FOR APPLYING THE ABOVE THEORY TO THE SCANDALS
The purpose of commercial law is to promote the social role of
corporations while restricting their socially detrimental activities.
Commercial jurisprudence should likewise have the same emphasis.
The first reason for that can be found in the achievements made in the
[area of the] social sciences concerned with legal studies. The most
convincing argument comes from Professor Kenichi Tominaga of the
University of Tokyo. His opinion is developed from a theory by Talcot
Parsons, an influential American sociologist of the 1950s. Professor
Tominaga's study is based on "structural-functional analysis," which places
society and community in a superior position to corporate systems in a
hierarchic structure. Therefore, society and community should impose
sanctions on certain corporate activities according to a determined moral
standard that dictates corporate social responsibility.
Moreover, corporate activities have a "public" side in addition to a
"private" side. Even privately held corporations should shoulder the
responsibilities of the "public" side, as a substructure within the overall matrix
of societal structures. Therefore, [for example] Professor Tominaga goes on
to say that problems such as the prevention and elimination of the pollution
emitted by corporations must be discussed in the context of the public side of
corporations. Corporate social responsibilities dictate sanctions be imposed
on activities related to the public side.4
In addition to theories of social science, the other basis is in the area of
business administration and economics. There had been heated debate in
these fields over corporations and social responsibility. However, as
previously mentioned, a majority of scholars in both the United States and
Japan now support the imposition of social responsibility upon corporations. 5
These scholars emphasize that the corporation itself constitutes a part of a
greater social system; that is, employees, customers and suppliers are organic
elements of the corporate structure and have [the right to make] reasonable
demands on the corporation, like shareholders. Management must, in turn,
accommodate the interests of these groups and it must satisfy their demands.
Private corporations, therefore, must hold society's trust and recognize that
4 Kenichi Tominaga, ed, Keiei to shakai (Management and Society), 15 Gendai keieigaku zenshii
15, 41; and Kenichi Tominaga, Kigy5 no shakaitei sekininron ni Isuite (On the Theory of Social
Responsibility of Corporations), 4-2 Tstisanjanaru 24 (Mar 1971).
5 See Tanaka at 121 (cited in note 3).
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public interest is a priority.6 The most influential advocate of this theory is
Professor Keith Davis of Arizona State University, who says that
corporations have social power, and "[s]ocial responsibility goes with social
power."7
The second reason [for promoting corporate social responsibility in
commercial jurisprudence] is based upon the legislative reasons for, or goals
of, corporation law itself. It is appropriate in this connection to quote the
words of Professor Dodd at Harvard University in a famous thesis: "business
is permitted and encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to
the community rather than as a source of profit to its owners." 8 In other
words, the law approves and encourages the corporate system since it
anticipates that corporations will perform a social role. Thus, the social
responsibilities of corporations can be discerned in the legislative intent of
[U.S.] corporation law itself. This concept of legislative intent has influenced
public opinion toward affirming the imposition of social responsibilities upon
corporations.
However, the [Japanese] Commercial Code provides that a corporation
is a juristic person for profit,9 and thus is legally authorized to pursue profit.
The issue, therefore, is whether this provision is consistent with the legislative
intent behind corporation law. At this point, it can be argued that the
legislative intent underlying [Japanese] corporation law is that corporations
be useful to society and simultaneously engage in profit-making activity as a
means for achieving this aim. In actual cases, corporation law may act to
restrict the corporation's commercial functions. Thus, the legislative intent
behind corporation law can be construed as affirming the social responsibility
of corporations.
The third reason [for commercial jurisprudence's support of the
corporate social role] is founded upon interpretations based on provisions of
positive law. First, the Japanese Constitution provides that "[p]roperty rights
shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare"([Japanese
Constitution] article 29 (2)),10 and article 1(1) of the Civil Code provides a
6 Katsuhiko Sakurai, Gendai Kigy5 no shakaiteki sekinin (Social Responsibilities of Present
Corporations) 99 (1976).
7 Keith Davis and Blomstorm, Business, Society, and Environment: Social Power and Social
Response 93 (2d ed 1971).
8 Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 Harv L Rev 1149 (1932).
9 Commercial Code article 52(l).
10 [Translators Note] The Japanese Constitution article 29(2), as translated in Eibun H~rei Sha Law
Bulletin Series Japan, Vol. I AA 7.
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blanket clause, "[a]ll private rights shall conform to the public welfare."'l
These provisions are intended to qualify the absoluteness of private rights, in
particular, ownership rights. "The public welfare" means the progress and the
development of the life of the whole social community. "All private rights
shall conform to the public welfare" means that the content and execution of
private rights should be in accordance with the public welfare. Moreover, the
effective of private rights may be denied to the extent that they conflict with
social welfare. 12
In Japan, however, ideas about modem individualism did not
completely prevail in some property relationships. It was feared that private
rights would be sacrificed by an automatic application of "public welfare" to
such property relationships. Therefore, it is recognized that article 1(1) of the
Civil Code must be construed in accordance with the concept of respect for
individual freedom stipulated in article 1-2 of the Civil Code. 13 It is also
recognized that individual freedom is not absolutely unrestricted, in light of
the relationship between private rights and public welfare. Since individual
freedom is minimally restricted, consistency mandates public welfare-based
restrictions be considerably passive. 14 Indeed, as to the scandals, sanctions
can be imposed on corporate activities only if they are in direct in violation of
laws. Nevertheless, even where scandals do not explicitly violate existing
laws, there remains the possibility of [the activity being] contrary to public
welfare.
In the banking scandals, for instance, speculative purchases of land
made by banks not intending to use [the land], but solely to increase profits
(especially those made through their subsidiary non-bank financial
institutions) caused land prices to skyrocket, adversely affecting the average
citizen. In the securities scandals, the securities companies' huge
expenditures to compensate customers for stock transaction losses and to
meet certain standard yields was not directly illegal under the pre-amendment
Securities and Exchange Act, but [the compensation] violated the [principle
of] autonomy of the stock transaction and thus unjustly disadvantaged other
customers. The result is an artificial distortion of natural market prices. In
11 I[Translator's Note] Civil Code article 1(1), as translated in Eibun H~rei Sha Law Bulletin Series
Japan, Vol. II, FA 1.
12 Sakae Wagatsuma, Shintei minp45 s5soku (The New Edition of the Civil Code General Provisions)
34.
13 Id at 34. Translator's Note] Civil Code article 1-2, as translated in Eibun H~rei Sha Law Bulletin
Series Japan, Vol. II, FA 1: "[t]his code shall be construed from the standpoint of the dignity of
individuals and the essential equity of the sexes."
14 Minoru Tanaka, Tsiishaku minp5 (1) (Commentary on the Civil Code) 64.
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such cases, corporations and their executives may be liable to the
shareholders or the customers who failed to receive compensation for their
losses. 15
Besides the above public welfare principle, the Civil Code provides
that "[t]he exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be done in good
faith and in accordance with the principles of trust,"16 and, "[n]o abuse of
rights is permissible." [Civil Code] § 1(2) and (3).17 In general, these
provisions can be applied to commercial law as blanket clauses. For
example, Commercial Code article 254-3 provides, "[t]he directors are
obligated to observe the provisions of the laws and ordinances and of the
articles of incorporation and resolutions of general meetings."'is Commercial
Code article 266(1)(v) provides for a director's liability to a corporation "in
the event of any act in contravention of any law, ordinance or the articles of
incorporation." Finally, the concepts of the above blanket clauses are
reflected in Commercial Code article 266-3(1), which provides for director
liability to a third party "[i]n case directors ... in executing their office."'19
Since the above blanket clauses appear to include, to some extent, the
directors' duty to make efforts to ensure that the corporation fulfills its social
role, Japanese law provides for a degree of social responsibility in the
interpretations of Commercial Code articles 254-3, 266(1)(v) and 266-3(1).
One may criticize the fact that the social responsibility of a director or
a corporation is so limited that it is difficult to derive a positive responsibility
from such blanket clauses. However, this is due to the vague wording of
blanket clauses; even scholars are divided in their interpretations of the
blanket clauses. While the degree of social responsibility expected of a
director or a corporation would be lower under a narrow interpretation,
expectations would rise significantly if the broader interpretation ever became
influential under pressure of public opinion.
In short, corporations may not engage in unrestricted business for
15 See the discussion in section 6.
16 [Translator's Note] Civil Code article 1(2), as translated in Eibun Hrei Sha Law Bulletin Series
Japan, Vol. II, AF 1.
n7 [Translator's Note] Civil Code article 1(3), as translated in Eibun Hrei Sha Law Bulletin Series
Japn Vol. II, FA 1.
1 8 [Translator's Note] Commercial Code article 254-(3), as translated in 2 Japan Bus L J A-21 (Oct
1981): "The directors are obligated to observe the provisions of laws and ordinances and of the articles of
incorporation and resolutions of general meetings and to execute their offices faithfully in the interest of
the co roration."
19 [Translator's Note] Commercial Code article 266-3(1): (Liability to Third Persons) If any
directors act with wrongful intent or committed gross negligence in executing their offices, such directors
shall be jointly and severally liable for payment of damages to third persons as well.
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profit's sake. Profit motives should be limited by social constraints. For
example, corporations should have refrained from holding back their
commodities during the oil crises. Today, corporations not engaged in real
estate must refrain from acquiring land since a sudden rise of land prices
resulting from speculative profits would significantly harm society. I believe
that the general public approves, with little objection, of a corporate
responsibility of self-restraint.
5. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE THEORY TO THE SCANDALS
It is indeed desirable to preempt such scandals by preparing the best
possible provisions and legislation. Except for a few problems, the Securities
and Exchange Act was amended to correct flaws in its provisions concerning
securities scandals. I am of the opinion, however, that it is more important to
confirm the existence of corporate social responsibility as the basis of such
provisions. The application of my fundamental theory of commercial law to
the scandals would yield the following results.
First, if corporations or directors of corporations restricted commercial
activities based on social requirements without unreservedly pursuing profit,
such conduct would be justified and not give rise to the directors' liability to
another to a corporation or a shareholder. 20 For example, in a purchase of
real property, if a corporation acquired the land for the purpose of selling it at
a high price rather than for usage or consumption, it would be construed as
breach of its social duties because of the resulting adverse rise in land price
and the harm to the general public. On the other hand, if the corporation were
to refrain from purchasing the land, resulting in lost opportunity for profits, it
may injure the corporation. Under my theory, however, in no case are the
corporation's executives liable to the corporation or shareholders under such
circumstances, because their conduct was reasonable. Moreover, before the
amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act, in no instance were the
directors of a securities company liable if the company lost a major client and
therefore lost significant future benefit as a result of refusing to compensate
the customer's loss, when the refusal was made in order to maintain fairness
among customers and so as not to distort the operation of the stock market.
This was the case even though the compensation of some customers for
losses would have been preferable to the company from the point of view of
maintaining customers and increasing future securities transactions.
20 Commercial Code arts 266 and 254-3.
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When a corporation's employee is ordered to perform a duty that is
explicitly against the social role of the corporation, he or she should be
entitled to refuse to comply with the order and not to perform the duty.
Indeed, when the employee is ordered to perform an illegal act, he can refuse
to do it; however, even if its illegality is not obvious, the employee
nevertheless should be entitled to refrain from performing the duties which
are counter to the social role of the corporation.
Second, the application of my theory to the securities scandals yields
the further consequence that a securities company's compensation of
customers for losses on stock purchases may trigger the directors' liability
despite the company's need to maintain customers and increase future profit.
Such activity violates the fiduciary duty under Commercial Code article 254-
3, and thus the director is liable for a violation of Commercial Code article
266-1(v). This illustration actually happened in a shareholder's derivative suit
against the Nomura Securities Company, discussed in the next section.
Third, comprehensive provisions in individual legislation cannot solve
all the problems that may arise from scandals. In some cases, it is even
doubtful that such provisions may be applicable. Under my theory, in a case
where individual legislation does not explicitly prohibit certain conduct, the
law nevertheless should not be construed as non-intervening. Rather, there
should be a limitation on such conduct, derived from the social role of
corporations. In the criminal penalty provisions, there is little opportunity for
broad interpretation because of the "principle of legality."21 In other areas of
law, however, my fundamental commercial law theory would allow for a
broader interpretation of law, and legal interpretation by analogy.
Fourth, securities companies' compensation against customer losses
may be construed as an unfair business practice under the Anti-Monopoly
Act. Some of the compensation methods would be deemed "discriminatory
pricing" (if goods are provided or accepted at an unfair price (General
Designations 22 item No. 3); "unjust low price sales";23 "unjust high price
21 [Translator's Note] Zaikei hjtei shugi (nulla perna nullam crimen sine lege) or, "there can be no
punishment without an explicit provision of law governing the crime."
22 [Translator's Note] Fuk5sei na torihiki h5h5, Fair Trade Commission Notification No. 15 of
1982. Article 19 of the Anti-Monopoly Act states, "[n]o entrepreneur shall engage in an unfair business
practice." Under article 2(9) and 72, the Fair Trade Commission shall designate the general categories of
unfair business practices applied to all fields of trade by means of notification [kokuji]. The categories of
unfair business practices thus designated by this notification are referred to in practice as "General
Designations."
23 Id at item No 6.
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purchasing"; 24 "Undue Customer Inducement by Unfair Benefits" 25), and,
consequently, in contravention of the Anti-Monopoly Act as unfair business
practices. The activities would be subject to a cease and desist order.26 An
entrepreneur who engages in an unfair business practice is liable for
compensatory damages to victims and may not be discharged from the
liability notwithstanding non-intention or negligence if a decision of the Fair
Trade Commission becomes final and binding.27 Moreover, if the damage
caused by an unfair business practice satisfies the elements of articles 709 or
715 of the Civil Code, the entrepreneur may be held liable for compensatory
damages under the above provisions. Where the unfair business practice is
implemented by a juristic act, the juristic act may be voidable only when that
unfair business practice is a [material] factor or a condition to the juristic act,
or when the fact of the unfair practice is disclosed to the other party.28 In
fact, fifty-one attorneys in the "National Security Research Group" claimed
that a securities company's compensation of customers against losses would
violate the Anti-Monopoly Act. The group then petitioned the Fair Trade
Commission to take action, such as a cease and desist order.29 Future
developments should be monitored.
6. AN OPINION ON THE DERIVATIVE SUIT SEEKING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
FOR COMPENSATION OF CUSTOMER LOSSES
On September 9, 1991, a shareholder of the Nomura Securities
Company who owns 1,000 shares brought a derivative suit in the Tokyo
District Court against ten directors, including the ex-CEO of Nomura, for
their liability in compensating Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) in the
amount of 362 million yen for losses incurred in stock transactions.
According to the complaint, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants
were in violation of the representative directors' fiduciary duty, on the
grounds that they compensated the customers for their losses despite a
circular promulgated in December of 1989 prohibiting such compensatory
acts, and that they were aware of article 50(l)(iii)30 of the Securities and
2 4 Id at item No 7.
2 5 ld at item No 9.
26 Anti-Monopoly Act, article 20.
27 Anti-Monopoly Act, article 26.
28 Tanaka and Kubo, Shinban keizaih5 gaisetsu san zenteiban (The New Edition of the Outline to
Economic Law, the Third Complete Revised Edition) 333.
29 Yomiuri Shinbun (Yomiuri Daily News) (morning edition Oct 5, 1991).
30 [Translator's Note] The Pre-amended Securities and Exchange Act article 50(1): A securities
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Exchange Act. The plaintiff further asserted that Nomura's representative
directors violated a fiduciary duty, requiring them to deal in the warrant bonds
at a fair price, when they unfairly transacted in warrant bonds in order to
compensate the customers for their losses. The plaintiff brought the
derivative suit under article 267(1)3 1 of the Commercial Code because the
representative directors' violation of fiduciary duty is included in Commercial
Code article 266(1)(v), making the defendants liable for 362 million yen in
compensation for damages, the amount of the compensation for losses
derived from the bond transactions. 32
Does this allegation have reasonable legal ground? This suit is based
on Commercial Code article 266(1)(v), which requires that (1) a director be in
violation of law or the articles of incorporation, and (2) the corporation
suffered damages thereby. The securities company's inducement by
promising compensation of a customer for all or a part of the customer's
losses at the time of the stock transaction was prohibited by article 50(1)(iii)
of the former Securities and Exchange Act. Therefore, if the directors
violated this provision, it is obvious that such conduct falls within the scope
of Commercial Code article 266(1)(v). However, since the compensation for
the loss after the stock transaction does not fall within the former Securities
and Exchange Act article 50(3), it could be maintained that the compensation
is not illegal under the former Securities and Exchange Act (provided that it is
under the old Securities and Exchange Act). Even after the December 1989
Circular was promulgated, a violation of the circular itself was not illegal,
since it is nothing more than an administrative guideline.
Therefore, will such a questionable action constitute a violation of
Commercial Code article 266(1)(v) and, as a result, incur director liability? If
mere violation of the Circular did not fall within Commercial Code article
266(1)(v), the compensation for customer losses would be strictly
distinguished as to when-before or after-the stock transaction was made.
The latter case could not constitute a violation of Commercial Code article
266(1)(v). This could be a conclusion according to former prevailing theory.
However, such conduct should incur director liability. In applying my
company, director, or an employee thereof shall not perform the following activities: ... (iii) with respect
to sales or other transactions relating to stocks, or transactions relating to stock option: solicitation of
customers by promising to bear all or a portion of losses incurred by customers on the said sales or
transactions.
31 [Translator's Note] Commercial Code article 267(1), as translated in 2 Japan Bus L J A-25 (Oct
1981): "A shareholder owning a share or shares for not less than six successive months may demand in
writingthat the corporation lodge an action for pursuing the liability of directors."3 21261 Sh~ji h~mu 38.
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theory, when a securities company compensates customers against losses
derived from stock purchases, such commercial conduct should be treated as
illegal conduct despite the company's obvious need to maintain customers and
secure future profit. The profit caused [for the compensated customers] by
such conduct should not be taken into account when mitigating damages.33
The directors would be in violation of their fiduciary duty under Commercial
Code article 254-3, and thus liable for compensatory damages in violation of
Commercial Code article 266(1)(v). In my opinion, it is not necessary to
distinguish between when the compensation against customer losses
occurred-even under the pre-amendment Securities and Exchange Act.
One may question whether the profit mitigates or eliminates the
damages where compensation against customer losses contributes to
maintaining or increasing the number of customers and profits the
corporation. As discussed above, the maintenance or increase of customers
should not be taken into account in the mitigation of the damages because the
act is derived from illegal conduct contrary to the social role of corporations.
While there are no direct provisions that refer to this point, by analogy, the
provision that prohibits a setoff when a credit to be setoff is derived from
tortious activity (Civil Code article 509)34 supports this conclusion.
7. CONCLUSION
The recent banking and securities scandals are a serious matter in the
Japanese business world. However, the commercial law world has not
sufficiently dealt with this matter. The social role of corporations should be
considered important in today's commercial jurisprudence. This problem has
been discussed above. In conclusion, whether or not there are specific
provisions for the corporation's actions, activities that run counter to the
social role of corporations must be strictly controlled. This position led me
to the above conclusions, including my opinion regarding the derivative suit.
One may object to my position on the ground that it is so strict that corporate
executives would suffer much inconvenience in their management, adversely
effecting Japanese corporate competitiveness internationally. However, strict
interpretation is necessary in order to maintain trust in Japanese corporations
and prevent distortions in the price-forming function of the market.
33 Hatoyama, Z5tei kaihan Nihon saikenh5 (S5ron) (The Supplemental Amended Edition of the
General Provisions of the Japanese Law of Obligations) 105. Wagatsuma, Saiken shjron (Minp K5gi 119
(General Provisions of the Law of Obligations (Civil Code Lecture IV)) 109.
34 See Wagatsuma at 241 (cited in note 37).
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Moreover, strict requirements are indispensable to Japanese corporations'
future international development. Japanese corporations must comply with
such strict requirements in order to modernize, be understood internationally,
and obtain the trust of their overseas working partners.
Finally, I would like to emphasize again that corporate activities should
be permitted only to the extent that they do not run contrary to the social role
of corporations, regardless of whether there are specific provisions governing
corporate activities; the corporate activities contrary to [social welfare] must
be strictly controlled.

